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THE MIRANDA WARNING AND THE TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Miranda
v. Arizona,' holding that prior to custodial interrogation, the police must
warn a suspect of his right to remain silent, that if he does speak anything
he says may be used against him, that he has a right to consult an at-
torney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him. The effect of the Miranda decision has been a shift in the conceptual
basis of the fourth,2 fifth,3 and sixth4 amendments by creating a conclu-
sive presumption against voluntariness when a person divulges self-
incriminating information while subject to custodial interrogation if he is
not warned of his fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment rights prior to ques-
tioning.
The purpose of this article is to question the broad application of
Miranda and its nontax progeny to initial tax fraud investigations in a
taxpayer's home or office. The thesis of the article is that in view of the
noncustodial, nonaccusatory nature of the tax fraud investigation prior to
the taxpayer's arrest and in view of the safeguards provided by the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS) to protect the taxpayer's constitutional rights,
there should be no broad application of Miranda and its nontax progeny
to pre-arrest tax fraud investigations. To apply Miranda to these cases
would be to use Miranda beyond its factual limitations and would be
contrary to the theory of our self-assessment income tax system which re-
quires a fairly free exchange of information between the taxpayer and the
IRS. A brief discussion of the IRS investigative procedure will illuminate
some of the differences between the tax fraud investigation and the typi-
cal criminal investigation.
II. IRS TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
The IRS has two division which deal in tax investigations, the Audit
Division and the Intelligence Division. The Audit Division, whose investi-
gators are called Internal Revenue Agents, investigates the possible civil
1384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 "The rights of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
3 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... "
4 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have Assistance of
Counsel for his defense."
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liability of taxpayers. The Intelligence Division, whose investigators
are called special agents, investigates the possible criminal liability of tax-
payers. The audit agent's initial function is basically to review tax re-
turns. When misstatements of tax liability appear in the returns or in
evaluation of other information the IRS receives, the agent ascertains the
proper liability and the IRS assesses a deficiency. Though the agents
interview taxpayers, they do not deal in the criminal area to any great
extent. Thus, this article will focus almost exclusively on the Intelligence
Division, whose function, as earlier stated, is criminal in nature."
There are four sources from which the Intelligence Division draws in-
formation of possible tax fraud: the Audit Division, independent initiative
of special agents, other government agencies, and the public. The Audit
Division furnishes approximately fifty percent of the leads for the Intel-
ligence Division. If, in his audit to determine the existence of civil liabil-
ity, an agent discovers what appears to be fraud, he notifies his superior,
who contacts the Intelligence Division and informs them of the discovery.
The agent makes no further inquiry into the possible fraud until the In-
telligence Division becomes involved with the investigation. At this point
the special agent assigned to the case may or may not enlist the agent's
assistance in the criminal investigation. Independent initiative of special
agents produces approximately twenty-five percent of the leads. Inde-
pendent initiative involves evaluation of information obtained from news-
papers and from surveys of particular occupations, income brackets, etc.7
Other government agencies are the source of fifteen percent of the leads.
These tips are derived from government investigation in nontax areas,
such as investigations in the illegal liquor and narcotics trades. The final
source of information is the public, which contributes ten percent of the
leads. This information is derived from public-minded citizens, frustrated
business competitors, and a small minority of persons aware of the reward
authorized for information which leads to tax fraud convictions.
The Intelligence Division investigates the above information in a three-
step process which operates much like a series of screens filtering out
cases which do not meet the criteria of the IRS for criminal prosecution.
At each step the possible success of the case, the limited availability of per-
0 In view of the fact that many of the leads in tax fraud investigations are derived from
audit investigations, it may be questioned whether or not Miranda might attach when agents
interview taxpayers in civil investigations. No court has gone so far as to hold that Miranda
applies this early. The fact that agents have responsibility in the civil area only and that the
need for fair collection of revenues by the government outweighs the taxpayers' need for
protection from self-incrimination at this stage are probably the basic reasons for not apply-
ing Mfiranda safeguards at this stage. In any event, this question is beyond the scope of
this article.
7 A special agent may notice the reporting of a large wedding in a local newspaper, for
example. He will then review the party's tex records on file with the IRS to determine if
the expense of the wedding is in line with the taxpayer's reported income.
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sonnel, the enforcement coverage," the flagrancy of the violation, the need
for emphasis in a particular area to deter other violations in that area,
the dollar value of the violation, and the presence of organized crime are
considered before forwarding the investigation to the next step. Each
step requires a more detailed investigation and thus is more time consum-
ing.
The first step in the investigative process is the evaluation of informa-
tion items to determine prosecution potential. At this point the Intelli-
gence Division scrutinizes returns and IRS files, discusses the case with
the audit agent or government official who referred the case, interviews
the informant, and makes inquiries without disclosing the taxpayer's
identity (i.e., inspection of public records). Since 91.4 percent of the
investigations come to an end at this stage, protection of the taxpayer's
name and reputation are of a high priority.
A preliminary investigation, which takes approximately two weeks,
is the second step in an Intelligence investigation. At this point the tax-
payer may be first contacted by a special agent. The special agent's ob-
jective at this stage is to interview the taxpayer and inspect his records,
if possible, and, if necessary, to contact third parties who have informa-
tion pertaining to the taxpayer's liability. Only 2.5 percent of the orig-
inal cases are investigated beyond this second step.
The final step of the investigation is the full-scale investigation of
the taxpayer. Here a two-year investigation is not uncommon. The
special agent's objective at this stage is to collect detailed evidence of tax
fraud which may be used against the taxpayer in criminal prosecution.
The taxpayer may also be interviewed at this stage in the investigation.
Following the full-scale investigation, the special agent submits a
complete report to his supervisor along with a recommendation for or
against prosecution. Regardless of his recommendation for further ac-
tion on the case, his supervisor reviews the information. When the super-
visor feels prosecution seems feasible, he sends the report to a review group
in the Intelligence Division which evaluates the case and if they feel
prosecution is warranted, they forward the case to the Assistant Regional
Commissioner, Intelligence. If the Assistant Regional Commissioner, In-
telligence, is satisfied that the case has merit for criminal prosecution, it
is transferred to the Regional Counsel, who causes it to be processed in
the Enforcement function of the Regional Counsel's office. Upon Re-
gional Counsel's decision to prosecute, the case is transferred to the De-
partment of Justice, which handles the trial of the case if it goes to court.
Of all the cases which originally enter the IRS tax fraud investigation,
only about one half of one percent actually go to trial. In 1967, a typical
8 To avoid the creation of "stale law' 'and the feeling of criminal immunity in a particu-
lar area of tax fraud, the IRS tries to prosecute approximately the same number of cases
in each tax fraud area.
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year, approximately 123,000 cases were submitted to the Intelligence Divi-
sion for investigation. Ten-thousand five hundred reached the preliminary
investigation stage. A full-scale investigation was conducted on only
3,188 cases. Of these, only six hundred actually culminated in criminal
prosecutions.
III. HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
TAXPAYERS
A brief history will indicate how the courts applied the fourth, fifth,
and sixth amendments prior to Miranda and the effect Miranda has had
on tax fraud cases. The history begins with the nontax case of Gouled v.
United States.' In this case the Supreme Court held that a government
agent violated the fourth0 and fifth" amendments when he obtained en-
trance to a person's office under the guise of friendship and there ob-
tained incriminating evidence for use against the person. The court
reasoned that search and seizure obtained by stealth could not be distin-
guished from search and seizure obtained by force which had already been
ruled in violation of the fourth amendment in Boyd v. United States.'2
The court interrelated the fifth amendment through the comparison of
stealth to force, which obligated the accused to supply incriminating evi-
dence against himself.
Turner v. United States'3 was one of the first applications of Gouled
in a tax case. In this case the taxpayers tried to apply the stealth-force
analogy to a case where a special agent allegedly informed the taxpayers
that he was conducting a routine civil investigation. The taxpayers per-
mitted the special agent to examine their records from which the special
agent extracted evidence used to convict the taxpayers of fraudulent un-
derstatement of income. The court recognized the constructive notice ef-
fect of an IRS investigation and therefore held that this case did not ex-
hibit deceit. Goided, therefore, was found not to be controlling. The
court reasoned that the taxpayers knew the special agent was conducting
an examination of their books for IRS purposes. Therefore, even if the
examination was routine, they must have known that the agent would not
close his eyes to evidence of fraud in the records.
About the time of the Turner decision, however, the federal district
courts in Pennsylvania and New York were developing another interpre-
tation of Gouled. These courts held that deceit was practiced when IRS
agents led taxpayers to believe that they were investigating civil liability
9 255 U.s. 298 (1921).
10 Supra note 2.
SSupra note 3.
12 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
13 222 F.2d 936 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955).
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when in actuality they were investigating criminal liability. In 1953 in
United States v. Guerrina4 a district court in Pennsylvania held that the
fourth and fifth amendments were violated when a revenue agent, with the
apparent purpose of ascertaining civil liability, searched the taxpayer's
records to procure evidence of fraud for a contemplated criminal proceed-
ing without informing the taxpayer of the criminal nature of his investi-
gation before obtaining permission to review the records. A New York
district court held in United States v. Lipshitz 5 that evidence should be
suppressed when a special agent investigating criminal liability had an agent,
already on the case investigating civil liability, obtain evidence for crimi-
nal prosecution without informing the taxpayer of the existence of the
criminal investigation. United States v. Wheeler 6 involved -a case where
special agents obtained permission to examine the taxpayer's records to
investigate possible civil liability. However, they were also interested in
the taxpayer's possible connections with wrongdoing involving an IRS
agent. While examining the books, the special agents found evidence
of fraud which was used to convict the taxpayer. The Pennsylvania dis-
trict court suppressed the evidence, holding that when the IRS investi-
gates civil and criminal liability and only tells the taxpayer of the civil
investigation, deceit is practiced on the taxpayer and the fourth and fifth
amendments are violated.
The deceit test of these district courts was not well accepted, however.
In fact, the second circuit disapproved the above district court decisions
and specifically followed Turner in United States v. Sclafani.'7 In this case
an agent gained permission to examine the taxpayer's records to investi-
gate civil liability. When the agent saw signs of possible fraud, the Intel-
ligence Division was called in without informing the taxpayer of the
beginning of the criminal investigation. Evidence was procured with which
the taxpayer was convicted of tax evasion. On motion to suppress the
evidence, the second circuit held that the fourth amendment requires only
that when consent is sought, the taxpayer be appraised of the govern-
ment's concern with the accuracy of his reports. The court reasoned that
such a warning put the taxpayer on notice of such hazards as may be
incident to' voluntary disclosure. These hazards include the possibility of
criminal prosecution. Several cases follow Sclafani and hold that where
agents practice no deception and do not mislead taxpayers into believing
that investigations would be limited to civil penalties, there is no violation
of the fourth and fifth amendments.18  In effect, then, prior to Miranda
14 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
15 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
11 149 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
17 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959).
18 Greene v. United States, 296 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 403
(1962); United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1964).
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it was generally held that deceit was practiced by the IRS only when an
agent made an affirmative misrepresentation that the taxpayer would be
subject to civil penalties only. There was no deceit practiced when the
IRS obtained information from a taxpayer without informing him that
a criminal investigation was being conducted because an IRS investigation
in itself was deemed to be constructive notice of the possibility of criminal
penalties.
On June 22, 1964, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in
Escobedo v. Illinois,19 holding that when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but begins to focus on a particular
suspect in police custody, the police interrogation lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements so that if the accused is denied opportunity to
consult a lawyer and is not effectively warned of his right to remain silent,
he is denied assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment.2 °
Though this decision is a landmark decision with reference to the sixth
amendment, it is more important with reference to Miranda in that it es-
tablishes the point at which the accusatory stage of a criminal investiga-
tion begins, i.e., when the inquiry begins to focus on a particular suspect.
Miranda, decided in 1966, prohibited the prosecution from using state-
ments stemming from custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates the
effective use of custodial safeguards of the accused's privilege against
self-incrimination. Custodial interrogation is described as questioning after
the accused has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way."' In Miranda the Supreme Court set
up a standard to guarantee that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel if he
spoke when interrogated after the accusatory stage of an investigation be-
gan.
The Miranda decision had little immediate effect on the constructive
notice theory of tax fraud cases developed prior to Miranda. The federal
appellate courts in every circuit hearing cases on the issue before 196922
have held that pre-arrest interviews held in the taxpayer's home or office
remain unimpaired by the Miranda decision because the taxpayer is not
in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way or because the accusatory stage of the investigation has not yet
10 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2
o Supra note 4.
21384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
22 Morgan v. United States, 377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967); Spinney v. United States, 385
F.2d 908 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d
785 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Mancuso, 378 F.2d 612 (4th Cir. 1967); United States
v. Maius, 378 F.2d 716 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 905 (1967); United States v. Mans-
field, 381 F.2d 961 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967); Frohmann v. United
States, 380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967); Feichtmeir v. United States,
389 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1968); Hensley v. United States, 406 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1968).
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begun. The Federal District Court in the Northern District of Illinois,
however, took a different view in United States v. Turzynski.2" The court
held that when an IRS investigation shifts from civil to criminal without
the taxpayer's knowledge, agents must warn the taxpayer of his constitu-
tional rights or have the evidence thus obtained suppressed. The court
felt that there was no difference between the situation where a person
incriminated himself because of ignorance of his rights and a coercive
custodial atmosphere or the situation where a person incriminates himself
because of ignorance of rights combined with an inference that the pur-
pose of interrogation is civil in nature. It felt custody was only relevant
in Miranda to announce the inception of the adversary process. Turzynski
thus became the leading case in support of the application of Miranda
to tax fraud cases and the reasoning was followed by other federal dis-
trict courts in Goodman v. United States24 and United States v. Wain-
wright.2 5
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Dickerson20
also followed the district court's reasoning in Turzynski. Dickerson in-
volves criminal investigation stemming from a civil audit. When the
special agent interviewed Dickerson he identified himself as a special
agent but did not advise the taxpayer that the investigation had become
criminal. Dickerson was convicted based on information derived from
subsequent interviews all conducted at his place of business. The court
felt that questioning the taxpayer in his own place of business did not re-
move an interrogation from the realm of custodial investigation in view
of the Supreme Court's holding in Orozco v. Texas17 that a warning was
required prior to interrogating a suspect in his own bedroom if it appears
that he is not free to go. The court determined that the defendant was
deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way because the average
citizen, when questioned by government agents, would not feel free to go.
It was also held that the taxpayer need not be under arrest in view of
Mathis v. United States2" where the Supreme Court suppressed evidence in
a tax fraud case in which the taxpayer was questioned without warning of
his rights while in jail serving the sentence for another crime. In view of
these cases, the seventh circuit held that Miranda warnings must be given
to a taxpayer under criminal investigation at the inception of the first
contact with the taxpayer after the case has been transferred to the Intel-
ligence Division or the evidence thus obtained would be suppressed. The
23 268 F. Supp 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
24 285 F. Supp. 245 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
25 284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968).
26413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
27394 U.S. 324 (1969).
28 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
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court thus held that the accusatory process begins when the Intelligence
Division enters the case.
Both Turzynski and Dickerson stand as a minority view in taking a
broad interpretation of Miranda. Both cases deny that the Miranda warn-
ing need only be given in accusatory, custodial interrogations. In so
doing, the courts who decided these two cases go beyond the strict holding
of Miranda and follow the majority of courts which deal with nontax
criminal cases in expanding the Miranda doctrine. The majority of courts
hearing tax fraud cases, however, still interpret Miranda strictly when
applying it to tax fraud investigations by the IRS.2 9 The majority thus
holds that Miranda does not apply to tax fraud investigations which are
noncustodial and nonaccusatory and therefore following the pre-Miranda
holding of Turnert 0 and Sclafani.3'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF MIRANDA TO
TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
The majority rule of non-application of Miranda to pre-arrest tax fraud
investigations is a more sound rule than the minority rule of Dickerson.
The fifth amendment prohibits compelling a person to be a witness against
himself in a criminal case.32 Prior to Miranda the fifth amendment test
was whether or not the self-incriminating statement was voluntarily
given. The Supreme Court realized that this test was inadequate when a
suspect was questioned while in custody and in foreign surroundings be-
cause psychological pressures could be exerted upon him in such a way
that it was impossible to determine whether or not his statements were
voluntarily given. To prevent abuse in these situations the Supreme Court
created the Miranda doctrine as an umbrella for protection of fourth, fifth,
and sixth amendment rights.
The questioning of a taxpayer in the second and third stages of the
IRS tax fraud investigation occurs, however, in the taxpayer's home or
office. The taxpayer is not under arrest or restricted in his movement to
any greater extent than he would be when visited by a business associate.
Since the elements of custody and foreign surroundings are not present, the
umbrella of Miranda is unnecessary to protect his constitutional rights.
Secondly, Miranda and the cases which follow it are only applied
when the questioning is accusatory, i.e., when the inquiry begins to focus
on a particular suspect. In the nontax cases to which Miranda has been
applied, the accusatory stage of the investigation only begins once a crime
219 Among the post-Miranda cases strictly interpreting Miranda in tax fraud cases are:
United States v. White, 417 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Browney, 25 AFTR2d
70-387 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Caiello, 25 AFrR2d 70-402 (2d Cir. 1969).
3
o Supra note 13.
31 Supra note 17.
3 2 Supra note 3.
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has been discovered. Prior to the discovery of the crime and prior to fo-
cusing upon a particular suspect, the questioning is considered investiga-
tive and Miranda does not apply. The tax fraud interrogation is neces-
sarily directed at a single person, since that person is known before the
crime is discovered. The purpose of the questioning, however, is to as-
certain whether, in fact, a crime has been committed, not to discover the
perpetrator of a known crime. This is demonstrated by the fact that pros-
ecution occurs in only about twenty percent of the cases where there is
pre-arrest interrogation. The questioning in a tax fraud interrogation is
therefore investigative rather than accusatory and Miranda should not be
applied.
Thirdly, one of the policy bases for the fifth amendment is that a
criminal system which relies on incriminating statements from the accused
to establish guilt is unreliable because a person threatened with physical
or psychological pressure is apt to confess to a crime he did not commit.
To protect the reliability of our judicial system's fact-finding process, the
incriminating evidence from the accused's own mouth must be suppressed
unless its validity can be assured. Miranda assures validity to some ex-
tent by promoting uncoerced confessions. However, prosecution in tax
fraud cases is not based solely on self-incrimination. If incriminating evi-
dence is obtained from a taxpayer, it is verified independently by the IRS
before it is used in prosecution.33 The IRS interrogation, therefore, does
not possess the inherent unreliability of unverified confessions. The re-
liability of our judicial system's fact-finding process is therefore protected
in tax fraud investigations without using Miranda.
Finally, even if it is assumed, as it was in Dickerson, that the IRS ques-
tioning of a tax fraud suspect prior to arrest creates a coercive atmos-
phere similar to that present in the nontax police interrogation, the IRS
has, of its own initiative, created procedures to insure that the taxpayer is
informed of his constitutional rights. The credentials of the special agent
now have a badge attached to them which aids in indicating to the tax-
payer that he is being confronted by a criminal law enforcement agent. In
addition, IRS News Release Number 89734 was issued in 1967. The
News Release requires that upon first contacting the subject of a criminal
investigation, the special agent produce his credentials for examination,
state that one of his functions is to investigate the possibility of criminal
violations of the Internal Revenue Code, and advise the suspect of his
constitutional rights. To insure that the requirements of the News Re-
lease are followed and that the taxpayer's constitutional rights are guar-
anteed, the IRS does not prosecute cases where crucial evidence has been
obtained by a special agent who has not informed the taxpayer that the
38 Supra note 5.
34 7 CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 5 6832.
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investigation has become criminal in nature, who has made an affirmative
misrepresentation or concealment, or who has failed to warn the tax-
payer of his constitutional rights prior to questioning him or gaining per-
mission to examine his records. 5 Thus the IRS, without judicial compul-
sion, has created its own method of safeguarding the taxpayer's constitu-
tional rights.
Rather than to undermine such laudable conduct by a police-type
agency as Dickerson would, a better approach would be to follow the hold-
ing of the fourth circuit in United States v. Heffner."8  There the court
held that when a government agency creates a procedure, such as is stated
in IRS News Release Number 897, it must follow it scrupulously even if
the procedure established is more generous than the Constitution requires.
The fourth circuit, then, recognized the factual limitations of Miranda
and also recognized the self-made restrictions of the IRS, which it properly
enforced. Such an approach adequately protects the taxpayer's constitu-
tional rights and avoids the necessity of making tenuous arguments for
the application of Miranda to cases which do not. fall within the factual
limitations of the Miranda holding.
V. CONCLUSION
The fifth amendment states that "No person ... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ,,37 There can be
no debate on this point. Miranda v. Aizona8 sets up specific safeguards
to protect the accused from denial of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Even in this respect the Supreme Court qualified its holding by pro-
viding that the prescribed warning be given unless other suitable safe-
guards were devised to protect the constitutional rights of the accused."9
IRS investigations differ somewhat from the "typical" criminal investi-
gation. It is questionable, therefore, whether Miranda applies. However,
the constitutional rights of a taxpayer are as sacred as those of the ac-
cused criminal, so they must also be protected. The IRS, by its own
initiative, has promulgated rules for special agents which guarantee the
protection of the taxpayer's constitutional rights. These rules are en-
forced within the IRS by restraint from prosecution in the event of viola-
tion of the rules. The IRS is not likely to strictly construe and thus
test their own rules because one of the basic purposes of criminal prose-
cution by the IRS is deterrence.40 The IRS obtains deterrence by main-
taining an almost perfect conviction record. Such a record cannot be
35 Supra note 5.
.6 25 AFTR2d 70-343 (4th Cir. 1969).
3 U.S. Const. amend. V.
38 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39 Id. at 444.
40 Supra note 5.
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maintained if the IRS attempts to litigate in "gray" areas, especially where
collateral issues are involved.
The IRS, therefore, effectively protects the taxpayer's constitutional
rights, and a further extension of Miranda is unnecessary. This is not to
say that there should be no judicial overseeing of the IRS in this area,
but rather that there should be restraint until the IRS self-regulation
proves inadequate. If inadequacy appears, there is judicial basis in the
case of United States v. Heffner4 1 to hold the Internal Revenue Service to
its own internal regulations.
Donald G. Paynter
41 Supra note 36.
